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Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 19050 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant appeals from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
granting defendant-respondent's Motion to Modify a Decree of 
Divorce entered on February 9, 1978. Appellant claims that the 
court, in modifying the Decree of Divorce, exceeded its discre-
tionary power, and that its order increasing and extending an 
award of alimony was such as to manifest a clear abuse of discre-
tion 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce was 
tr i ,_,d to the i •1wf'r court, and the lower court granted respondent's 
1nr··· '"'' rnccr etJ•' ,,,,,d ir·ying the alimony provision of the divorce 
_,,._ '" increase monthly alimony payments, and to extend 
ti1" ,_-,,, i._j,i .. t sa1rl payments are to be made. This appeal is 
:· 1 r - • I ·- h .o 1 l e ri 1 n g t h a t or d e r . 
NA2.H (ms) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Order of Modification 
reversed, and also seeks to have this court determine that the 
provision of the Decree of Divorce providing for the payment of 
alimony for a fixed period and for a fixed amount is a judgment 
of the court and not subject to modification. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant filed an action for divorce on 
May 19, 1977, to which defendant-respondent filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim for divorce. The matter was heard by the Honorable 
David K. Winder, based upon a stipulated agreement of the par-
ties, as stated in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R 34-38). 
Judge Winder entered a specific Finding of Fact (No. 5, 
R-35), wherein he found: 
"5. That plaintiff has recently become a practicing 
surgeon in Salt Lake City, Utah, and earns $2,600.00 
net per month; that defendant is employed as a hair 
stylist and earns $702.00 net per month; that the 
sum of $500.00 per month as alimony for a five (5) 
year period and $250.00 per month as child support 
until the minor child reaches the age of 21 years 
or no longer lives with defendant or until the 
further order of the court, whichever event first 
occurs, is a reasonable sum to be awarded defendant 
under the circumstances said nlimony and child 
support payments to commence on the 1st day of 
December 1977, and continue on the 1 ike day each 
month thereafter." 
findings whereby the property 
'!I ,j I o t ' i b 11 t e rl 
,, , ''" ,,,,on the findings of the court, a Decree of Divorce 
enrcr"'' "'''i•h provided, in part, as follows (R-44): 
"3. Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered and 
required to pay to defendant the sum of $500.00 
per month by way of alimony and $250.00 per 
month as child support; said alimony payments 
3ha 11 commence on December 1, 1977, and terminate 
after the November payment in 1982. Said child 
support payments to commence on the first day of 
December 1977, and to continue on like days each 
month thereafter until said child reaches the 
age of 21, or no longer resides with defendant, 
or further order of the court whichever occurs 
first." 
On November 10, 1981, defendant-respondent filed her 
Petition for Modification of Support and Alimony Award, requesting 
both an increase in the amounts of the award, and an extension 
for the pctyment of alimony beyond the five year term set by the 
cn1J1" t ( R 49-52). Defendant a 11 eged a sub st anti a 1 change in the 
financial circumstances of the parties as the basis ,for her 
petition. 
At thP time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
, 1e1n1 ,,, ,-,. !'n1ployed as a surgeon by the Western Surgical 
, I I' is the court found, a net monthly income of 
''' rr,,.. t1mP ,,f che hearing of the modification 
"1np] ,Jyed t y the same association, with a 
NA4.H (ms) 
monthly net income of i1,l71l nrl (lx. i), however, plaintiff, 
since the entry of the divorre liad purchased an ownership 
interest in the association which afforded to him the right to 
participate in any profit of the association. This included both 
profit-sharing and pension program plans, and annual bonus if the 
association profit permitted. In 1979, plaintiff's bonus was 
approximately $15,000; in 1980, approximately $24,000; and in 
1981, approximately $23,500. Even though these bonuses were paid 
for these three years, plaintiff testified that there was no 
guarantee of the bonuses and, in fact, testified that because of 
additional members to the association, there was concern as to 
whether or not the bonuses would be paid in the future (T-70). 
Thus, the payment of such additional sums was not a certainty. 
Defendant continued to sustain herself by her continued 
employment as a hair stylist, and her income was about the same 
each year. 
The court found that at the time of the divorce, the 
parties anticipated that the income of each would increase (R ), 
and that the defendant expected that she would be able to meet 
her own needs financially within the five year period for which 
alimony was awarded (R-130). The court further found that this 
had not occurred, and that the same was 1 material change of cir-
cumstances. 
... 
'I A' II I rn' I 
lh"' c· "' 1 f•irther found that the plaintiff's income 
h.111 ;11, ond thot this likewise was a material change of 
( /I JI fn) t 3 r1 i_ !--' rl 
i'nci"'r its find in gs, the court ordered that the a 1 imony 
award of the court be modified and increased from $500 per month 
to $600 per month, and extended the period of payment through 
November 1987, or an additional five years. In addition, the 
court increased child support from $250 per month to $400 per 
month, and awarded defendant an attorney's fee of $1,000. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
P 0 I NT I: The Court Erred in Extending the Period for Alimony 
Payment. 
P 0 INT I I: The Court Erred in Finding a Material Change of 
Circumstances and in Increasing Alimony and Child 
Support. 
P 0 I NT I I I: The Court Erred in Awarding Attorney's Fees to 
Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXTENDING THE PERIOD FOR ALIMONY 
PAYMfNT. 
the major purpose of alimony in Utah is 
1 ... '"'t 11111.11 ion nf the so called "breadwinner" spouse's duty to 
5 
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support and maintain the other spouse, with the apparent rational 
being to save the latter from destitution and from becoming a 
public charge. See Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144; Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 1 Ut.2d 4g, 269 P.2d 284. Alimony, however, should not 
be considered as an annuity, and where, as in this case, the wife 
was, and is, self-supporting, alimony awards should be considered 
and intended to give the wife time and assistance in becoming 
self-supporting. 
The accomplishment of the purpose of alimony can be 
by lump sum awards, payable in installments. Bader v. Bader, 
18 Ut.2d 407, 421 P.2d 150. Where such is made by the court, the 
matter is res judicata, it being the effect of the Decree of 
Divorce to provide a full settlement of the matters between the 
parties. 
Thus, when Judge Winder entered his order in the divorce 
proceedings, it seems apparent that by awarding to the defendant 
a substantial portion of the marital assets, and by fixing the 
period of time and amount of alimony to be paid, that he intended 
to fix all distributions between these parties. Although he did 
not use the apparent magical phrase "Lump sum alimony", he cer-
tainly did the equivalent by awarding $500 per month for five 
years. How more determinative could the words "lump sum" have 
been? What could be more "in gross" or "lump sum" than the 
6 
llj/\ / ( rr· 
•1)1 ,.-11:1."lt I '"'1<12 Hinder 7 
I,. I 11 1 : 'li •rcurnstance, the Michigan Supreme Court 
h , : , I i ", .Jr »e •l<ocree, when not appealed, became final as to 
·h• µ1 1 rEqu1red •limony of $125 per month for two years, 
even w1;;-, .. Lhe use of the words "in gross" or "lump sum". See 
Edgar v. Edgar, 366 Mich. 580, 115 NW.2d 286. 
Appellant believes there is sound public policy involved 
in fixing the term and award of rehabilitative spousal alimony, 
as here provided. It may provide an incentive to use diligence 
in procuring required training or skill development, so as to 
enhance one's ability and self-reliance, thereby allowing the 
recipient to continue in some reasonable approximation of stan-
dard of living estab1ished during the marriage. 
Defendant's continued employment in her profession was 
as anticipated by the trial court at the divorce; it was her 
choice to do or not to do, more or less; it was the court's 
intent to fix the period for her to make whatever adjustment she 
desirerl in her life style. An annuity or retirement was never the 
intent uf the court. 
Appe11ant respectfu1y submits that where alimony is in a 
f1,P•' "'" L'> b2 oaid for a specific term, it is in fact an award 
!'' ,,-,.1 ,11ou 1 h-· ·1 i•::ori the finality of a judgment, and 
NAB.H (ms) 
thus not subject to modifir,11 ,,,,,,, 11,1''''1 upon an alleged change of 
circumstances. From .J1JdgP l-J1n,1'" f indinq of Fact, and con-
sidering his distribution of mar ital assets, it seems clear 
that this was precisely his intention, 
As this court said 1n Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Ut.2d 360 
438 P.2d 180: 
The parties should be entitled to rely on 
the finality of the alimony award in determining 
the right to receive and the duty to pay." 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED JN FINDING A MATERIAL AND SUBSTAN-
TIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND BY INCREASING 
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 
this court stated: 
"rhe modification of divorce decrees is a matter 
of equity, and it is the duty and prerogative of 
this court to review both facts and the law 
(cases cited)." 
In this light, appellant submits that a review of the 
facts and the law will indicate that the lower court abused its 
discretion, or misapplied principals of law, in finding a 
material and substantial change of circmstances that would 
permit an increase of both alimony and chilrl support payments. 
The matter of income changes was addressed in Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976), whPrein thP rourt stated: 
" 11111""''Jl1 a,1 "'crease in the income of a divorced 
'"ft: rlo<"s 1rui, of itself, determine a reduction of 
.. , ' ' "JU 1r y , 1 t h u doe s an i n c re as e i n the income of 
1 husbanrl, of itself, determine the main-
1i=.:11,...1n· r< ·if alimony. 
',Jed•) riot want to confuse alimony with annuity." 
To qualify for a modification of a divorce decree, the 
pa1 ty seeking the modification must show a material and substantial 
change of circumstances. This requires three things: 
1. Materiality. 
2. Permanency. 
3. Unforseeability. 
Here, all three requirements are suspect and, in fact, 
apparently were not considered by the lower court. 
The materiality of the claimed change of circumstances, 
when considered in light of the ruling in Dehm, supra, would 
indicate that an increase of income alone may not be sufficient. 
This is projected further when the facts are reviewed. Here, 
Dr. Naylor was beginning his medical practice and was employed by 
a medical group at the time of divorce. His net monthly income and 
his position in practice was acknowledged by the court's Finding 
of Fact (R-35) His net income at the time of divorce was $2,600 
!Tlllnth 
Li,,, time of the modification hearing, Dr. Naylor had 
, ,. " .,,. ,,,[,,,. uf t11,., medical group by agreeing to purchase 
9 
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shares of the group. As a membPr, he was entitled to a salary 
plus bonus participation in profits shown by the group. As shown 
by Exhibit 7, his net pay per month has increased to only $3,170, 
a rather small increase. Although he had received bonuses for 
the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 (T-37), and anticipated a bonus 
for the year 1982 (T-67), the only income he could rely on was 
the salary he received each month, which, as seen, is not 
materially or substantially greater than his salary at the time 
of divorce (T-6g). 
As found by this court in the 1977 case of Cummings v. 
Cummings, 562 P.2d 229, the permanancy of the claimed change of 
circumstances must be continuous to be substantial. There must 
be no indication that the claimed change is likely to reverse 
itself in the near future. 
The appellant testified that the practice of his group 
was down, and that there was no guarantee that the bonus funds 
would be available in the future. 
It thus becomes evirlent that the permanent and con-
tinuous nature of the source of additional funds to the appellant 
could, and most likely would, reverse itself in the near future. 
In looking beyond the appPllont's salary, the court abus 
its discretion. 
lf) 
'' 1' I 11 I fTl' 
." 1 tile t im<' of rJ ivorce, the change of circumstances 
rnusl n,.; hove foreseeable; otherwise, the doctrine of 
res jud1catJ must be applied. 
The tacts of this case are that at the time the 
original decree was entered, the court found that the appellant 
had recently become a practicing surgeon. This implies that 
the court recognized a future medical practice by the appellant, 
together with some additional income benefits in the future. 
This was foreseen by the court and considered by the court. 
Were the court not to project these matters, any effort by the 
appellant to better his position would, in effect, work as a 
penalty. 
Recently, this court, in the Case of Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.?.d 44, said: 
"The purpose of alimony is to 'provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard 
of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and 
to prevent the wife from becoming a public 
charge.'" 
Using this as a yardstick, it appears certain that the 
stand0rd of living was fixed by the original court, and that the 
f1Jttore were, in fact, foreseen by the court. The claimed 
;,.;nc1J' ,Jr ,_ ,, c11rn<;tances was foreseeable by the court and cannot 
11 l" '' i 111..--d 
11 
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P IJ l NT I I I 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWAROING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded 
defendant, the moving party for modification, an attorney's fee 
of $1,000, together with her costs. 
This was an application by the defendant to increase and 
extend alimony and support. It was her application to modify the 
court's order. It was not based upon any fault or actions by the 
plaintiff. As a matter of fact, plaintiff had followed, without 
any default. the orders of the court. 
Appellant submits that the defendant does not have abso-
lute right to attorney's fees, and is required to make at least a 
prima facie showing of her need, or of the conduct of the plain-
tiff, to justify such an award. Neither was done, and fees 
should not have been awarded. Callister v. Callister, 1 Ut.2d 34. 
261 P.2d 944; Gale_ v. Gale, 123 Ut 277, 258 P.?.d 986. 
CONCLUSION 
From the records and testimony found here, it is clear 
that the original Decree of Divorce was intended by the court to 
settle all matters between the parties. The plaintiff conceded 
property based upon the f i x i n g 1, .v t 11 r <. ,, u rt of defendant ' s a l i -
many award. The dee is ion by the court included the fixed 
a 1 i mo n y award , and sh o u l rl be s us t > in e h y th i s court , and the 
,,, 0 ,d it Utf_' •iriqi11al dPr_rep 0f alimony for a fixed period and 
"""J"n I :h'''' 1 i :Je cons i Jer ed as a lump sum award, and not subject 
to modif1i:.rit1un 
i\ rl J ·; t i ,_,,1 ct I l y , there are 1 a ck i n g the es sent i a 1 e 1 em en ts 
required in finding a change of circumstances of the nature and 
type to warrant any modification. Any change in the appellant's 
financial condition is not material, since his monthly income has 
increctsed very little since the divorce decree was entered; any 
bonus funds received have no idication that they will be paid in 
the future, or will be permanent by any factor; and any improve-
ment made by appellant was certainly foreseen and anticipated by 
the court and the parties at the time the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. 
Considering all of the facts and circumstances, the order 
of the lower court in extending the period of time for the payment 
of alimony, the increase of alimony and support, and the award of 
attorney's fees should be reversed by this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June 1983. 
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